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Again, the validity and effect of such a divorce may be brought in
question in a third state; by what code of law shall it be judged?
By that under which it was obtained? But the respondent has
never been under the jurisdiction of this code, nor is she now.
With equal force it may be urged on behalf of the husband that
he cannot be subjected to the law of the wife's domicile, in regard
to the divorce elsewhere obtained. As to the law of the forum of
the present litigation, it is to be observed that neither of the parties
were within the scope of its jurisdiction when the dissolution of
the marriage tie took place. Whatever rights were thereby lost or
acquired, were so lost or acquired under another sovereignty, nor
is it easy to comprehend how the acquirement of domicile within a
third sovereignty by one, or even both parties, can in any way
alter these rights.
The rights here spoken of, it must be borne in mind, are not
those which, attendant on a person's condition as married or single,
are established by the law of their residence for the time being,
but the right to such condition of married or single, which the
person claims to have acquired elsewhere, and to have possessed
before he took up his residence in the state where his personal
status is now brought in question. Practically, as well as theoretically, this result constantly comes about, that a divorce obtained in one state is held invalid in another, and the distressing
confusion thence resulting, the individual suffering and the injury
to public morality, are most deplorable. It would be useless to
attempt to add anything to what Judge REDFIELD and Lord
BROUGIHAM have said on this subject. See 3 Am. Law Reg., supra,
and Story Confl. of L., § 226 c.
C. CHAUNCEY.
(To be continued.)
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GEORGE W. ECKLAR v. GALBRAITII ET AL.
A promise to pay a debt discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy is valid and
will support an action.
But if it be a conditional promise to pay when able, the plaintiff creditor must
show ability as part of his case, and ability to pay means ability after payment of
all new debts contracted since the discharge in bankruptcy.
An heir had received advancements from his granltler, but on the latter's
death partition of his real estate was had by legal proceedings, in which no notice
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was taken of the advancement. Under the law of Nentncky the heir was not liable to repay the advaneenent out of the real estate set off to him in the partition,
and it conl not therefore be treated as a debt in determining his ability to pay
his debts.

APPEAL from the Harrison county court.

In 1862 Ecklar recovered a judgment against Galbraith and
Lail for $641.31 with interest, an execution upon which judgment
was returned "No goods found." On the 20th of March 1869,
Lail was discharged by the Bankrupt Court. In October 1869 he
promised the plaintiff to pay the debt due to him, which was barred
by the discharge; the promise, as alleged in the petition in the
present suit, being "that he would pay the plaintiff's debt as soon
as he was able, for it ws.s a just and honest debt." The petition
further alleged the ability of the defendant Lail. The evidence
showed that Lail had sold a tract of land, received from his grandfather's estate, for $6150; that the plaintiff's claim amounted,
with interest, to $1128.75, the other debts of the defendant to
$4888.81, and the homestead exemption to $1000, making a total
of $7017.56. As to one item of the indebtedness, as claimed by
the defendant, there was a dispute. The defendant had received
advancements from his grandfather over and above his interest in
said grandfather's estate; the excess amounting to some $83400.
After the death of the grandfather a suit was instituted for the
partition of his realty, which resulted in the setting apart to Lail
of the land before mentioned; in this suit no mefition was made
of the excessive advancement, nor did the other heirs claim that the
amount should be -deducted from the realty assigned to Lail.
Subsequently, in an action to settle the rights of the distributees
as to the personalty of the decedent, it was found that Lail had
received in advancement the sum of $3400 more than his proportion and he was allowed nothing out of the personalty.
A. H. Ward and Blair

for appellants.
Afartin,
M

J. Q. Ward, for appellee..
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-Ecklar held and owned an unsatisfied judgment
against Galbraith & Lail. Galbraith was and is insolvent, and
Lail had been discharged from the payment of the debt by a judgment in bankruptcy, rendered by the District Court of the United
States for the District of Kentucky.
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In his original petition Ecklar states all these facts, and then
alleges that, in October 1869, Lail promised and agreed with him
that, notwithstanding his discharge in bankruptcy, he would pay
to him the sum of money evidenced by the said judgment against
Galbraith and himself.
By an amendment to his petition Ecklar stated facts showing that
the promise declared on was not an unconditional promise, but a
promise to pay thejudgment "as soon as he (Lail) was able."
By a second amendment, filed June 27th 1874, Ecklar averred
that Lail was then able to make the promised payment.
The promise and all the material allegations of the petition and
the amendments were denied by Lail. A trial in the court below
resulted in a judgment dismissing Ecklar's petition, and he prosecutes this appeal.
It was necessary, to enable appellant to recover, that he should
prove, not only the making of the promise, but the existence of
the condition upon which it was to become enforceable. The ability of Lail to pay is the essence of the undertaking, and it must
be satisfactorily proved, otherwise no judgment can be rightfully
rendered against him: Atason v. fgLghart, 9 B. Monroe 480;
Egbert v. Aclcehael, Id. 44; Kingston v. Wharton, 2 S. &
R. 208.
When Ecklar proved that Lail held and owned property subject
to the payment of debts of value probably sufficient to satisfy his
claim, he made out his right, prind facie, to a recovery. But
Lail could defeat this apparent right by proving that the payment
of debts contracted honestly, and in the irdinary course of his
business, subsequent to his discharge in bankruptcy, would exhaust
his estate and leave nothing to be applied to the satisfaction of
Ecklar's demand."
The promise declared on is a promise to pay when able. It was
founded upon a moral obligation, and not upon a valuable consideration received at the time it was made. It cannot be presumed
the debtor intended, or the creditor expected, that the rights of
persons who had dealt or who might thereafter deal with the late
bankrupt in his ordinary business transactions should be subordinated to, or even placed upon terms of equality with, the right
secured to Ecklar by the conditional promise upon which he founds
his action. The promise must be construed to be an undertaking
upon the part of Lail to pay Ecklar out of the first surplus property
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he should acquire, and there can be no surplus until he satisfies
the claiias of those who have extended him credit upon the fa'th
of his non-liability to pay the debts from vhich he was discharged
by the judgmcrt in bankruptcy.
But the court below erred in treating the excess of advancements
received by Lail from the estate of his grandfather, Joseph Shawon,
deceased, as a debt due from him to the distributees or personal
representatives of the decedent. His co-heirs had the right, before
the partition of the real estate descending from their common
ancestor, to have the matter of advancements inquired into, and
their respective rights in that regard adjusted. But they did not
see proper to do so. In an action in equity, to which they were
all parties, one hundred and twenty-three acres of land were set
apart aad conveyed to this appellee. No lien was retained to
secure the repayment of advancements made by the ancestor to
him, and no claim asserted against him on that account. ie took
a free and unencumbered title to his land, and the judgment under
which lie holds remains to this day in full force and effect.
Subsequently, in an action to settle the rights of the distributees
as to the personal estate of the decedent, it was found that appellee
had received advancements to the amount of $8400 more than his
proportion, and therefore he was allowed nothing out of the personalty. But the court did not pretend to adjudge that he should refund this excess. The distributees and the personal representatives
appreciated the fact that he was under no legal obligation to refund
and sought no judgment against him. As before stated, they might
have compelled him to -account for this excess in the action in
which the real estate was portioned, by insisting that he should
receive no part of the realty until they were each and all made
proportionately equal with him, but they did not choose to exercise
that right. They are now all bound by the judgment of partition,
and have no claim against appellee on account of advancements.
It was, therefore, error upon the part of the court below to allow
proof of this supposed claim to go to the jury; and also error to
instruct them that they should include it in the estimate they were
to make as to the amount of appellee's indebtedness.
As appellant declined to submit to a general continuance, the
court did not err in refusing to allow him to file an amended petition after the testimony had all been heard. The amended petition
VOL. XXV.-11
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would have worked a material change in one of the issues of fact
upon which the parties went to trial.
For the errors stated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded for a new trial upon principles not inconsistent with this
opinion.
The question as to what is a sufficient
promise to pay a debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy has sometimes
been regarded as one with the question
what is a sufficient promise or acknowledgment to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitations. There is however
an important difference between the
characters of the two bars, viz. : The
Statute of Limitations affects merely
the remedy, while the discharge in
bankruptcy is a discharge of the debt
itself, at least legally speaking, and,
therefore, the analogy of many of the
cases which tend to shake the force of
the statute, should be very sparingly
applied to eases in which it is sought to
remove the bar of a discharge. It is
easy to see more than a technical reason for the distinction. In the case of
a discharge the ruined man has made,
theoretically, at least, all the payment
in his power; he has surrendered his
entire property and it has been divided
amongst his creditors, who have had
every opportunity to examine into his
conduct and ascertain whether or not it
has been tainted with fraud, and if it
has the discharge is refused; whereas
in a plea of the statute, the debtor
usually relies at most upon the negligence of his creditor and sometimes is
taking advantage of his forbearance.
The fluctuations of the decisions with
reference to the statute need not, therefore, be considered in regarding the
first question raised by the principal
case.
In the first place there can be no doubt
that a promise to pay a debt barred by
a discharge in bankruptcy is a valid
promise, and the moral obligation resting
upon every man to pay his just debts,

no matter how protected by the law
against their payment, is a sufficient
consideration to support a promise.
In Kingston v. U'licarton, 2 S. & R.
208 (1816), TILGIBIAN, C. J., said :
"It was once doubted whether a new
promise by a bankrupt after obtaining
his certificate was binding, but it has
been long settled that it is binding, because the moral obligation to pay continues, notwithstamding the discharge,
and that obligation is a sufficient consideration for a new promise."
In Ir'ait v. Morris, 6 Wend. 394
(1831), SAVAGE, C. J., said : "Inthe
case ofa debt barred by a discharge, the

demand is extinguisl'ed in law, though
it still exists in equiti and good conscience, and as Lird It:SFIELD said
in Turnan v. Fenton, ' there is no honest man who does net discharge them
if he afterwards has it in his power to
do so. Though all legal remedy may
be gone the debts are clearly not exBut the
tinguished in conscicce.'
legal demand being extinct it cannot lie
enforced unless revived or renewed hby
a new promise. * * * There must
be a promise for wbich the old debt is
a sufficient consideration."
In Briggs 4- Fly v. Sutton, Spencer's
Rep. 581 (N. J. 1846), CARPENTEIR,
J., remarked : " Not the weight only
but the whole current of authority sustains the consideration of an express
promise by a bankrupt to pay a prior
debt from which he has been discharged
by bankruptcy when the promise has
been distinct and unequivocal."
The current of authority is that suit
must be brought upon the new promise,
although in a case in 'Massachusetts,
Jlaxua v. 3iorse, 8 Mass. 127 (1811),
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an action on the original promise was
sustained ; yet sec contra Field'sEstate,
2 Rawle 351 (1830) ; Eghert v. McMichl, 9 B. Mon. 44 (1848) ; and it is
to be noticed that in the Massachusetts
case the objection was not made until
after verdict.
The right of recovery resting upon a
new promise by thc debtor, it follows
that to give an unconditional right there
must be an absolute and unconditional
promise; a mere recognition of a moral
liability does not suffice; and it also follows, that the debtor may annex to his
promise to pay the barred debt such
conditions as he may see fit ; which
conditions must be fulfilled and proved,
and as the fulfilment is a condition precedent to recovery it must be averred in
the declaration.
The rule is well stated by STORY, J.,
in Bell v. Morrison, I I'cters 351. "If
the bar is sought to be removed by the
proof of a new promise, that promise as
a new cause of action, ought to be
proved in a clear and explicit manner,
and be in its terms unequivocal and
determinate, and if any conditions are
aniexed they ought to be shown to be
performed."
In Stewart v. Recklhs, 4 Zab. 427
(1854), POTTS, J., said : "Te eCx:
pression of an intention to do a thing
is not a prominse to do it," and held the
doctrine before set forth.
In Staunton v. Brown, 6 Dana 248
(1838): the promise was to pay in seven
years "provided lie is then able to do
so without depriving himself and family
of the means of support ;' it was held
that the harr. must aver ability.
In Sconton v. Eislord, 7 Johns. 36
(1810), where the promise was " provided lie could pay him without distressing his family," the court said : " It
has been repeatedly held that a promise
to pay, when able, a debt barred by the
Statute of Limitations, or by a certificate under the bankrupt law, was not
an absolute but a conditional promise,

anl it lay with the plaintiff to prove the
defendant able." "
In Kinydstoz v. Wfharton (snpra),
"YEATES,

J., said: The cases cited on

the argument fully show that a promise
to pay when able is a contingent debt
and not absolute, until the happening
of the event. Ability must be ascertained by the proper proof."
In Mason v. llnqliart, 9 B. Mon. 480
(1849), the promise was to pay when
able and ability was averred. GnIAJZAM,
J., said : "It is a promise dependent
upon a very uncertain contingency
which may never occur, yet it is one
which has been enforced. * * * The
ability to pay ought to be clearly proven.
The mere opinion of witness that a
party had means sufficient wherewith to
discharge the debt ought not to be regarded as sufficient evidence. The jury
should be fully satisfied, by.facts proved
to exist, that tie debtor has property and
means which enable him to pay. They
ought not to be satisfied to make experiments on doubtful proof and by rendering a verdict for plaintiff again
reduce a struggling debtor to hopeless.
insqlveTicy, leavwng-the judgment unsatisfied."
Thi's brings us to the consideration
of the meaning attached to abflity, by
the learned judge in the principal case:
He held that that word meant ability on
the part of the debtor to pay, after discharging the indebtedness contracted
subsequently to his discharge in bankruptcy, and that the promise did not put
the hoilder of the revived claim on a
level with creditors whose claims ind
accrued subsequently to the discharge:
This seems to us only a fair and just
interpretation of the promise. Persons
contracting with a discharged bankrupt
have a right to think that they arc dealing with a new man, unburdened by the
,weight of his past leblts, and that whatever property lie has theif is primarily
liable to them. Indeed it would seriously affect the value of a discharge, if
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this trust and faith therein, as an obliterator of old debts, were to be swept
away by the knowledge that, whenever
a conscientiou- person discharged in
bankruptcy, should promise to pay a
former creditor when able. the first property obtained by the debtor would be
liable to be seized by the creditor, while
the subsequent creditors would be left
with no fund for the payment of their
As reequally meritorious claims.
marked by Gixsoxf, C. J., in Field's
Estate (supra), "A promise to pay
an antecedent debt would be a positive
breach of faith to those who had given
credit on the foot of the certificate."
The remark was a mere dictum and not
necessary to the decision of the case,
which merely affected the right of the
revived debt in question to rank as a
specialty, -and the present case is the
first, so far as we have been able to discover, in which the doctrine has been
authoritatively announced, but its justice and good sense seem to us striking.
As to the second part of the opinion,
the statute of Kentucky bearing on the
subject is as follows, viz. " Any real or personal property or

money, given or devised by a parent or
grandparent to a descendant, shall be
charged to the descendant or those
claiming through: him to the division
and distribution of the undevised estate
of the parent or grandparent, and such
party shall receive nothing further
therefrom until the other descendants
are made proportionately equal with
him, according to his descendible and
distributable share of the whole estate,
real and personal, devised and undevised ;" I Staunton Rev. St., ch. 30,
17, p. 436.
We are unable to see anything in this
statute contrary to the well-established
principle that an advancement is not
recoverable, nor do we see that the fact
that the heirs, for whose benefit the
statute was made, had neglected to take
advantage of its provision when they
might have done so in the proceedings
in partition, alters the case ; the statute
gives no action ; it merely gives, so to
speak, a right of retainer, which, like
all other rights, must be taken advantage of in the proper way and at the
proper time.
I. BuoD, JR.

Supreme Court of the United States.
Ex PARTE R. S. PARKS.

Where an inferior court has jurisdiction of the cause and the person in a criminal
suit, and no writ of error lies to the Supreme Court, the latter will not review the
legality of the proceedings on habeas corpus.
It is only where the proceedings below are entirely void, either for want of
jurisdiction or othcr cause, that such relief will be given.
Whether a matter for which a defendant is indicted in the District Court is or is
ndt a crime by the laws of the United States, is a question which that court must
decide, and is within its jurisdiction. This court will not review its decision by
habeas corpu.
The cases of Yeager, 8 Wall. 85, and Lange, 18 Wall. 163, referred to and
approved.

for habeas corpus. The petitioner was convicted of
forgery in the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Virginia, and was in custody by virtue of a commitment
under sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for said offence.
PETITION
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Complaining that his conviction was illegal by reason that the act
for which li was convicted was not a crime against the laws of the
United States, he applied to the circuit judge for a habeas corpus,
and after a hearing thereon was remanded into custody. Not being
satisfied with this decision, he applied to this court for a haleas
corpus. His petition set forth that he "is illegally confined in
jail, at Harrisonburf, in Virginia, being in the custody of A. S.
Gray, as Marshal of the United States for the'Western District of
Virginia, by'virtue of a commitment under an illegal sentence of
the District Court of the United States for the said district, the
same (sentence) being void and in law a nullity, for want of jurisdiction in the said court to pass it upon and against your petitioner,
which said sentence was pronounced in a case of the United States
against your petitioner, a transcript of the record whereof is herewith presented. That your petitioner heretofore made application
to the honorable judge of Circuit Court of the United States for
the said district, that lie would order the discharge of your petitioner upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out for that object, but
his honor, the said judge of the Circuit Court, instead of discharging,
remanded him to the custody of the said marshal, as will appear
from a transcript of his order in the said matter, which transcript
is likewise herewith presented. And that your petitioner therefore
prays at your honors' hands the benefit of the writ of $abeas corpus,
to be directed to the said marshal, commanding him to have before
your honors, at a day and place to be named therein, the body of
your petitioner, together with the cause of his capture and detention, to undergo and receive whatsoever your honors shall then
and there consider of him in that behalf."
The transcript of the record of conviction which accompanied
the petition, showed that the petitioner was indicted for forging the
signature of C. Douglass Gray;, Register in Bankruptcy, to the
following receipt
"IHARRISONBURG, July 80th 1872.
"Received of J. D. Martin, by R. S Parks, his attorney, the
application, with necessary papers, for adjudication in bankruptcy
of said Martin, also fifty dollars, amount of required deposit.
"C. DOUGLASS GRAY, Register."
One count of the indictment charged that Parks committed the
forgery for the purpose of authenticating the commencement of
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proceedings in bankruptcy in the case of J. D. Martin. Another
count alleged the purpose to have been to authenticate a proceeding
in the said case, namely, the filing of the paper with the register.
There was a third count which did not state the purpose.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-Thc petitioner contends that the forging of the
receipt is not a crime by any act of Congress, and that as the
courts of the United States have no common-law jurisdiction of
crimes, the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him for the
offence. The indictment is founded on the 46th section of the
Bankrupt Act (re-enacted and made more general in section 5419
of the Revised Statutes), which declares that "if any person shall
forge the signature of a judge, register or other officer of the court,
or knowingly concur ia using any such forged or counterfeited
signature * * * for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding
or document, * * such person shall be guilty of felony," &c.
The petitioner insists that the paper whose forgery is charged is
not a document which could be used in evidence in any proceeding,
by reason of its being authenticated by the official signature of the
register. This proposition may be questioned. But suppose it
were true, the receipt could be used in evidence, if genuine, for the
purpose of showing the fact stated therein as against the signer in
his official as well as private capacity. At all events it is not clear
and free from all doubt that the forgery is not within the terms of
the statute.
But the question whether it was or was not a crime within the
statute was one which the District Court was competent to decide.
It was before the court and within its jurisdiction. No other court
except the Circuit Court for the same district, having concurrent
jurisdiction, was as competent to decide the question as the District Court.
Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is not a crime
by the law which the court administers (in this case the statute
law of the United States), is a question which has to be met at
almost every stage of criminal proceedings ; on motions to quash
the indictment, on demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment, &:.
The court may err, but it has jurisdiction of the question. If it
errs there is no remedy after final judgment, unless a writ of error
lies to some superior court; and no such writ lies in this case. It
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would be an asumption of authority for this court, by means of the
writ of habeas co)pus, to review every case in which the defendant
attempts to controvert the criminality of the offence charged in the
indictment. It having been held that the regulation of the appellate power of this court was conferred upon Congress, and Congress
having given an appeal or writ of error in only certain specified
cases, the implication is irresistible that those errors and irregularities which can only be reviewed by appeal or writ of error cannot
be reviewed in this court in any other cases than those in which those
processes are given. Now, it has always been held that a mere error
in point of law committed by a court in a case properly subject to
its cognisance, can only be reviewed by the ordinary methods of
appeal or writ of error ; but that where the proceedings are not
only erroneous but entirely void, as where the court is without jurisdiction of the person or of the cause, and a party is subjected
to illegal imprisonment in consequence, the superior court or judge
invested with the prerogative power of issuing a habeas corpus,
may review the proceedings by that'writ, and discharge from illegal imprisonment. This is one of the modes in which this court
exercises supervisory power over inferior courts and tribunals; but
it is a special mode, and confined to a limited class of cases.
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is
issued in England were well settled by usage and statutes long before
,the period of our national independence; and must have been in the
mind of Congress when the power to issue the writ was given to
the courts and judges of the United States. These principles,
subject to the limitations imposed by the federal constitution and
laws, are to be referred to for our guidance on the subject. A
brief reference to the principal authorities will suffice on this occasion.
Lord COKE, before the Habeas Corpus Act was passed, excepted
from the privilege of the writ persons imprisoned upon conviction
for a crime, or in execution: 2 Inst. 52 ; Com. Dig., --ab. 0orp. B.
The Habeas Corpus Act itself excepts those committed or detained for treason or felony plainly expressed in the warrant, and
persons convict, or in execution by legal process: Com. Dig. Id.
Lord HALE says : If it appear by the return of the writ that the
party be wrongfully committed, or by one that hath not jurisdiction,
or for a cause for which a man ought not to be imprisoned, he shall
be discharged or bailed: 2 Hale's H. P. C. 144.
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Chief Baron GILBERT says: "If the commitment be against law,
as

"Oeing made by

one who had no jurisdiction of tile

eause,

or of

a

matter for which by law no man ought to be punished, the court
are to discharge:" Bac. Abr., Dab. Cowlj. D. 10.
These extracts are sufficient to show that when a person is convict or in execution by legal process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, no relief can be had. Of course a superior court will
interfere if the inferior court had exceeded its jurisdiction or was
not competent to act.
The courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction on this
subject from the Constitution and Laws of the United States. The
14th section of the Judiciary Act granted to all the courts power
to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpitus, and all other writs
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law ; and to the justices
and judges, power'to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose
of inquiry into the cause of commitment; but it added a proviso,
that the writ should not extend to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under or by color of authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the same, or necessary to be
brought into court to testify. It was found necessary to relax the
limitation contained in this proviso, and this was done in several
subsequent laws. (See Act of 1833, 4 Stats. 634, passed in consequence of nullification proceedings in South Carolina; Act of
1842, 5 Stats. 539, passed in consequence of the iNcLeod (ase ;
and Act of 1867, 14 Stats. 44, passed in consequence of the state
of things that followed the late rebellion.)
The power of the Supreme Court is subject to a further limitation arising from its constitutional want of original jurisdiction on
the subject; from whence it follows that, except in aid of some
other acknowledged jurisdiction, it can only issue the writ to review
the action of some inferior court or officer: Ex parte Barry, 2
How. 65.
From this review of the law it is apparent, therefore, as before
suggested, that in a case like the present, where the prisoner is in
execution upon a conviction, the writ ought not to be issued, or, if
issued, the prisoner should at once be remanded, if the court below
had jurisdiction of the offence, and did no act beyond the powers
conferred upon it. The court will look into the proceedings so far
as to determine this question. If it finds that the court below has
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transcended its powers, it will grant the writ and discharge the
prisoner even after judgment : Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38;
Ex parte 1'ells, 18 How. 307; Ex parte Eange, 18 Wall. 163.
But if the court had jurisdiction and power to convict and sentence,
thc writ cannot issue to correct a mere error. We have shown that
the court below had power to determine the question before it;
and that this is so is further manifest from the language of Chief
Justice M..RSHALL in the case of Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters 203.
Ie there says : "To determine whether the offence charged in the
indictment be legally punishable or not is among the most unquestionable of its [the court's] powers and duties."
But after the thorough investigation which has been given to
this subject in previous cases, particularly those of Yeager and
Lange in the 8th and 18th volumes of Wallace's Reports, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further at this time.
The last-mentioned case is confidently relied on as a precedent
for allowing the writ in this case. But the two are totally unlike.
In .Lange'scase we proceeded on the ground that when the court
rendered its second judgment the case was entirely out of its hands.
It was fitntus officio in regard to it. The judgment first rendered
had been executed and satisfied. The subsequent proceedings
were, therefore, according to our view, void.
But in the case before us the District Court bad plenary jurisdiction, both of the person, the place, the cause, and everything about
it. To review the decision of that court by means of the writ of
habeas copus would be to convert that writ into a mere writ of
error, and to assume an appellate power which has never been conferred upon this court.
Since the cause was submitted to the court, the learned counsel
for the petitioner has called its attention to the case of Booth
and i-ycroft, 3 Wis. 157, as a case precisely in point in favor of
granting the writ. It had probably escaped the recollection of
counsel that this very case was reversed by this court in Ablernan
v. Booth, 21 How. 506, in which Chief Justice TATMEY delivered
one of hbs most elaborate and able opinions.
As thc entire record has been brought before us by the petition,
and we are clear as to our want of authority to discharge the
prisoner, the application for the writ is denied.
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Supreme Court of R~hode Island.
JOB FALKENBURG v. HENRY C. CLARK.
On the back of a bill of lading was pasted a printed paper prescribing the number of lay days and the rate of demurrage to be paid by the ""cargo, consignee,
or assignee," after their separation. It appearing in evidence that the consignee
had received a duplicate bill of lading with a similar printed paper pasted on its
hack and that he had thereafter received the cargo without objection : Ield, that
the printed paper was a part of the bill of lading.
In an action on the case by a ship-owner against the consignee of the cargo for
demurrage: Held, that if the consignee as such had nothing to do with the shipment there would be no privity of contract between him and the ship-owner, and
before acceptance of the cargo, the law would imply no contract ot his part to pay
demurrage ; but that the evidence as to acceptance, with any explanatory testimony,
should be left to the jury with the instruction that from an acceptance unexplained
of goods under a bill of lading containing provisions for demurrage, a contract
for payment of this demurrage by the consignee would be implied.
On the back of a bill of lading was an endorsement, " Pay the demurrage to
order of M[essrs, C. & K." signed C. P. R.,-C. 1'. R. being the ship's captain.
Tlhd, that the claim for demurrage could not be assigned by the endorsement so
as to enable the assignee to sue in his own nanie ; bills of lading not being negotiable so as to allow tie holter to ste at common law, although made thus negotiable by statute in England and held thus negotiable in admiralty practice in this
country.
field, further, that this endorsement was to be construed merely as giving
authority to receive the demurrage and to discharge the claim therefor.
The consignee of a cargo ordered in his own name cannot avoid liability for
demurrage by giving notice to tile ship captain on arrival that the cargo was
ordered for an hitherto undisclosed principal.
Demurrage is a mere expression, being compensation for detention, often, hut
not always, regulated by contract. The rate thereof, even if agreed on, is not
always concluded by the agreement.

ACTION on the case by Falkenburg, owner of a vessel, against

Henry C. Clark, the defendant, as consignee of the cargo for
demurrage, or detention of his coal vessel. The other facts appear
in the opinion.
Peree and Ifallett, for plaintiff.
T 4 linghast J"Ely, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POTTER, J.-The first count, for book account, in its present
shape, need not be considered. The second count alleges that the
defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of one hundred
dollars, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance
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and request of the defendant, had before hat time suffered and
permitted the said defendant to retain and keep, and the said
defendant retained and kept, the said ship or vessel, whercof the
plaintiff was owner, with certain goods, &c., on board thereof, for
a long time * * * two and three-quarter days, whereby the plaintiff was put to charge and expense, deprived'of the use of the vessel, and in consideration thereof promised, &c.
There are also the usual money counts, including one for money
paid and laid out and expended.
Runnel, the captain of the vessel, signed four bills of Jading at
Alexandria, Va., August 3d 1869, receipting for 363 tons of coal,
to be delivered at Providence, to the defendant or his assigns.
On the back of the bill was a memorandum in these words:
"Report - 7 o'clock A. M., 16th ; high water, 3 o'clock P. v. ;"
and this indorsement, "Pay the demurrage to order of Messrs.
Chace & Knickerbocker;" signed, " Charles P. Runnel."
There was also a printed paper pasted on the back of the bill,
containing these words in red ink:"And twenty-four hours after the arrival at the above-named
port, and notice thereof to the consignee named, there shall be
allowed for receiving said cargo at the rate of one day, Sundays
and legal holidays excepted, for every hundred tons thereof; after
which the cargo, consignee, or assignee shall pay demurrage at the
rate of eight cents per ton a day, Sundays and legal holidays not
excepted, upon the full amount of cargo, as per this bill of lading,for each and every dy's detention, and pro rata for parts or portioris of a day beyond the days above specified, until the cargo is
fully discharged; which freight and demurrage shall constitute a
lien upon said cargo."
Evidence was offered to show that the captain arrived in Providence Sunday, August 15th, at noon, reported to the consignee
August 16th at 7 A. m., and wai at the consignee's wharf at high
water, 3 P. 1bI. of that day; that he was ready to unload, but a
delay was caused by sufficient cars not being provided, and he did
not finish unloading until August 23d, and the plaintiff, the owner,
now seeks compensation for this delay. In the Corhmon Pleas a
verdict was found for the plaintiff, under the rulings of the presiding judge. The defendant brings the case here upon exceptions
to these rulings.
1. The defendant's counsel objected to the admission, as a part

FALKENBURG v CLARK.

of the bill of lading, of the paper printed in red ink, which was
pasted on the back of it, evidence having been offered that a similar
one was pasted on the back of the duplicate sent to and received
by the defendant, and asked the judge to charge that it was no
part of the bill of lading, and could not be considered by the jury;
but the judge did chhrge that it was a part of the bill of lading,
and to be considered by the jury as such.
The defendant's counsel contends that a consignee or assignee
of a bill of lading cannot be liable for demurrage, except on an
express contract.
Of the cases he cites, Gage v. forse, 12 Allen 410, holds that
a consignee cannot be liable, except on a promise express or implied. In thot case the defendant, who was consignee, had before
delivery assigned the bill of lading and had paid the freight, and
the goods were delivered to his assignee. The court held there
was no contract by the consignee, express or implied. In a similar
case, Lewis et al. v. .iTeKee, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 37, a consignee
was sued. He had before acceptance assigned the bill, of which
the plaintiff had notice, and delivered to the assignee. The consignee was held not liable. So in Smurthwaite v. Milkins, 11 0.
B. N. S. 842; Young v. 11_oeller, 5 E. & B. 7 ; same case in
Exch. Oh., 5 E. & B. 755; and 'Chappelv. Comfort, 10 0. B. N.
S. 802, were decided on their special circumstances.
In Jesson,v. Solly, 4 Taunt. 52, which was against a consignee
on a general coant in assumpsit for demurrage, the court held that
if the defendant took the goods under the bill of lading he adopted
the contract.
There is some diversity in the language used by the courts as to
whether, in case of the consignee's acceptance, a contract is to be
implied by law, or whether the whole question is for the jury. See
Saunders et al. v. JVanzeller, 2 Gal. & Day. 244; 4 Ad. & E. N.
S. 260 ; Blanchard et al. v. Page et als., 8 Gray 281, 293 ; Cook
v. Taylor et al., 13 East 399 ; approved in Dougalv. Kemble et al.,
3 Bing. 383; Shaw v. Thompson et al., Ole. 144, 149. But we
think the sound rule is (and one which we think reconciles the
cases), that while if the consignee is merely consignee, and bad
directly or indirectly nothing to do with the shipment, there would
be no privity of contract, and the law would imply no contract
before acceptance; the evidence relating to acceptance, with any
rebutting or explanatory testimony, should be left to the jury. with
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the instruction that from an acceptance unexplained of goods under
a bill of lading containing such conditions, a contract would be implied. This seems to us the reasonable view. And this remedy
may coexist with the remedy against the consignor: Shiepard v.
Dc Bernales, 13 East 565 ; 3 Kent Com. by Holmes *228, note;
Herman v. Clar-ce et aL, 4 Camp. 159 ; Scaie et al. v. Tobb, 3 B.
&Ad. 523 ; Stindt v. Roberts et al., 2 Saund. & C. 212; Wegener
v. Smith, 15 C.B. 285; Pelayov. Fox, 9 Penna. St. 489. In Evans
v. Poster et al., 1 B. & Ad. 118, it was held that where the bill of
lading provided for freight only, the owner and not the master
was the person to sue for demurrage; the court remarking that
the inconvenience of bringing two suits might be guarded against
by inserting a few words in the margin, as was done in Jesson v.
Solly, 4 Taunt. 52; see, also, Brouncker v. Scott, 4 Taunt. 1;
Smith v. Sievekling et al., 4 E. & B. 945.
In some of these cases which bold that the consignee by receiving
the goods under the bill of lading adopts the contract, the bill
provided for freight only. But the principle must be the same
where it provides for demurrage.
The defendant also contends that the memorandum pasted on
the back was no part of the contract.
In Jesson v. Solly, 4 Taunt. 52, which was on a general count in
assumpsit for demurrage, a memorandum was made at the bottom
of the bill of lading that there were to be sixteen lay days, and X8
per day demurrage. The objection was raised that neither consignor nor consignee had signed the bill. The objection was overruled on the ground that the defendant might produce the counterpart if different.
In the case of The Andover, 3 Blatch. 803, the words "contents
and weight unknown " were written with a pen at the bottom of
the bill; the court (NELSON, J.) gave effect to this memorandum as
showing that the bill of lading was not to be considered as binding
for any particular weight.
In Chappel v. Comfort, 10 C. B. N. S. 802, the provision for
lay days was in the margin. But no doubt was expressed as to its
constituting. a part of the contract. And such memoranda are
mentioned as common in Abbott on Shipping *303.
These cases show that such memoranda have been before the
courts, and have been considered as a part of the contract. In
Chappel v. Comfort, 10 C. B. N. S. 802, WILLES, J., says he
should rather give greater effect to what is thus written. The
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addition to or alteration of the printed form shows that that particular matter was especially thought of by the parties.
In the present case, the memorandum as to demurrage was on a
printed piece of paper, pasted on the back of the bill.
In the case of Wilson v. Tucker, decided by this court, 10 R. I.
578, a memorandum was written on the back of a promissory note,
"to be paid according to contraet." The court held that the jury
might infer from the writing and from the custody of the note that
the memorandum was made at the time the note was executed, and
that in such case it was a part of the contract.
The question whether the memorandum in this case makes a
part of the contract is only important as to the question of damages. If the provision in the pasted paper is binding on the
defendant by his acceptance, then there was a contract completed
on the plaintiff's part which could be given in evidence under the
second count. If not, then the plaintiff might under the same count
be entitled to recover for unreasonable detention as much of the
amount claimed as the jury think right. Even if a rate is agreed
on, it is not always conclusive: Abbott on Shipping *806.
For while it is held in many cases that the demurrage cannot be
recovered on a special count for demurrage, unless there is a special
provision for demurrage, it is well settled by the more modern
cases that the consignee will yet be held liable in a proper action
for any delay caused by himself: Abbott on Shipping *806; 1
Kay on Shipmaster and Seaman 151 ; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y.
85 ; 11orse et al.v. Pesant et al., 2 Keyes 16 ; Fordet al. v. Cotes=
worth et als., Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 127, 136; s. c. in Exeh. Ch.,
Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 544; and many of the English cases we have
been referred to were decided more or less upon technicalities of
pleading, and this is to be consilered in endeavoring to extract
from them any general rule of decision. Smith v. Sieveking et al.,
4 E. & B. 945; s. c. in Exch. Oh., 5 E. & B. 589, was an attempt
to hold the consignee liable for demurrage at the port of loading.
In Moeller v. Young et ates, 5 E. & B. 7, reversed in the Exch.
Ch., 5 E. & B. 755, the cargo was delivered in portions, owing to a
dispute about freight, and the question was, who was to blame for
the delay? The Exchequer Chamber held the consignee was not
in default, and the judges lay a good deal of stress on the point
that the contract was not proved as alleged. So Saunders et al. v.
Yanzeller, 2 Gal. & Dav. 244, was decided upon the pleadings.
Demurrage is a mere name. It is, says STORY, J., In re The
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Apollon, 9 'heat. 862, 378, merely compensation for detention
often regulated by contract, but not necessarily so. It is merely
an extended freight: Iolt, quoted in 1 Ab. Adm. 554 ; Jesson v.
Solly, 4 Taunt. 52. It would seem from the latter case as if a
special provision for demurrage had been but lately introduced.
And in Sprague v. West, 1 Ab. Adm. 548, 554, BETTS, J., says:
"Every improper detention of a vessel may be considered a demurrage, and compensation in that name may be decreed for it." In
that case the bill of lading contained no provision for demurrage,
but BETTS, J., saying that the English cases hold that the freighter
is liable without any express contract, and that the freighter or
consignee who improperly detains a vessel is liable for it, decreed
against the consignee damages by way of demurrage. The head
note does not mention this. The last two cases were in admiralty,
but the reasoning applies generally.
See the cases of 1orne v. Bensusan, 9 C. & P. 709; Sanders et
al. v. Vanzeller, 4 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 260; and in Smith v. Sieveking, Exch. Ch., 5 E. & B. 589, the judges spe.ik with apparent
approval of Tesson v. Solly, 4 Taunt. 52, and Wegener v.
Smith, 15 C. B. 285, as* holding that the consignee is liable for
demurrage accruing from his own delay. See, also, 1 Parsons on
Shipping, ed. of 1869, 312; and IARRIS, J., in Olendanielv. Tuckerman, 17 Barb. S. C. 184, 190. And in Kell v. Anderson, 10
M. & W. 498, while the question -was as to when the lay days
began, Lord ABINGER, p. 502, recognises the doctrine that if the
delay was caused by the defendant, he would be liable in an action
of the case, though not in an action for demurrage.
The only difference seems to be that where there is an express
agreement fixing days of demurrage, the consignee will be more
strictly held to them : Leer v. Yates, 3 Taunt. 387 ; 'armanv.
Gandolph, 1 Holt N. P. 85, and note; Ford et al. v. Cotesworth
et als., Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 127, 136; same case in the Exch. Ch.,
Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 544, citing Maule & Pollock on Shipping; see
Abbott on Shipping *810, 317, citing Bogers v. H-iunter, 2 C. &
P. 601, and 1 M. & M. 63; Dobson v. Droop, 4 C. & P. 112, and
1 M. & M. 441; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y: 85.
Much of the mystery which some persons seem to consider attached to maritime contracts would be dispelled if it was generally
known that they are subject to the same rules as other contracts.
In the present case, if we are to understand the judge as in-
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tending to charge that the piece of paper pasted on the back of the
bill of lading was a part of the contract, as a i.atter of law independently of the evidence, it would undoubtedly be erroneous.
But evidence had been offered showing that the defendant, before
receiving the coal, had received a duplicate bill containing a similar memorandum on the back, and that lie made no objection.
There was no evidence to the contrary. Understanding the judge,
as we think we must, to mean that if such were the facts the memorandum was a part of the contract, we think there was no error.
2. The defendant offered to show that the coal, although
ordered in his name, was ordered for his customers, and that as
between the defendant and his customers it was their property,
they paying charges and taking all risks, and he receiving only a
commission ; that this cargo was ordered in this way of the American Coal Company, upon an order received by him from the Lippitt Woollen Company, and was their property, and was landed at
defendant's wharf, and that the delay was caused by the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company not furnishing cars in proper
season upon the order of the Lippitt Woollen Company, under a
contract between them and the Railroad Company.
And the defendant asked the court to charge that if the jury
found the coal was the property of the Lippitt Woollen Company
from the time it was shipped, and the captain on his arrival had
timely notice of that fact, and the delay was from the cause above
stated, the defendant was not liable. But the court refused to
charge as requested, and did charge the contrary.
We think the request was properly refused. The coal was not
only consigned to the defendant, but was expressly ordered by
him. If the defendant directly or indirectly ordered the consignment he was of course primarily liable, or if it was consigned to
him without his request, and he nevertheless accepted it, he was
liable. It is not contended that up to the time of the vessel's
arrival the consignors, or owner, or captain, knew any other person than the defendant in the transaction. If the defendant made
the contract in his own name for a principal unknown to the plaintiffs, he then stands in the light of an agent for an undisclosed
principal, and would be liable-the plaintiffs knowing no other
party. As consignee, he might transfer the property by assignment of the bill of lading, and might in many cases transfer the
property without such assignment. This would, however, only give
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to such vendee the right to claim to have the coal delivered to him.
But the question here is, whether if the defendant has ordered the
consignment to himself, or has accepted it, and thus made a complete contract, he can afterwards, without the consent of the other
contracting party, shift the burden from himself and compel the
plaintiff to look to others for performance of a contract made with
him alone.
We think he cannot. If he has made the contract he is liable
for its fulfilment.
In the present case, there is no claim that the bill of lading was
ever assigned by the defendant, or that the owner or master ever
agreed to look to any other person than the defendant for his
claim.
Others may be liable to the defendant if they have injured him
in this respect, but the plaintiff is iot obliged to look beyond the
defendant.
3. The defendant asked the court to charge that the demurrage
having been assigned by the endorsement on the bill, the plaintiff
could not maintain the action.
If the endorsement was intended to assign the claim for demurrage, it could not be assigned so as to enable the assignee to sue
in his own name. In England, by statute 18 & 19 Vict., c.
111, bills of lading are invested with the character of negotiability,
so that the holder may sue; and the case is so here in admiralty,
but the common law remains unchanged: 1 Kay on Shipmaster
and Seaman 373.
Besides, we think the fair construction of this endorsement is
to consider it as merely an authority, or power to receive and discharge the claim.
Exceptions overruled.
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tT AL. v. FERGUSON, EXECUTOR OF SAMUEL
R. McELWEE, DECEASED.

The act of self-destruction cannot be judicially regarded as proof perse of insanity.

It is but a fact, together with all other facts in the case, from which the
capacity of the testator, not at thb
time of committing suicide, but at the time of the execution of the will in question.
The question of " sound" or "unsound mind" must depend upon the fiets and

court or jury are to determine the testamentary
circumstances of each partLicular case.

A person recovering from an attack of mania a potu, made his will. and on the
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following. daV committed suicide. The court being of opinion, upon .onsidernttion
of all the circumstances of the case, that the testator was possessed of testamentary
capacity at the time of making the will, sastained it.

from the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City.
This appeal was taken by the caveators, from the decree of the
Orphans' Court of Baltimore City, overruling their objections to
the will of Samuel R. McElwee, and admitting the same to probate.
APPEAL

John C. King, for the appellants.-The testator had not at the
making of the will, a "sound and disposing mind," as required by
the express language of the Code. He was the victim of a disordered mind, and of delusions and hallucinations-the unequivocal
evidences of insanity: Art. 93, sect. 800, of the Code; Redfield
on Wills, sect. 9; Taylor's Med. Jur. 629; Ray's Med. Jur. sect.
129 (ed. 1860); 1 Redfield on Wills, sect. 10, pp. 71, 72; Wharton & Still6, sect. 185.
To be sane, the mind must be perfectly sound, otherwise it is
unsound, and " where there is delusion there is insanity."' Asound mind is one wholly free from delusion : 1 Redfield on Wills,
sect. 11, pp. 78, 79.
A will which is the direct offspring of partial insanity is invalid,
although the general capacity is unimpeached : 1 Redfield on Wills,
pp. 78, 79; Boydv. Ely, 8 Watts 71 ; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 824;
Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill 10.
The act of suicide in this case was not the result of sudden
impulse at the time when committed, but the result of a condition
of mind and body previously existing and well defined, anticipated
even by the friends of the testator as well as by his physicians.
If suicide committed by the testator soon after making his will, is
not conclusive evidence of insanity, a person's state of mind and
body which is clearly demonstrated to have produced the act, is
conclusive evidence of insanity: 1 Redfield on Wills, sect. 14, pp.
111, 117. This is the distinction between the case under consideration, and cases like Burrows v. Burrows, 1 Hagg. 109 ; Duffield
v. Morris, -Ex'r,2 Harrington 375, and another class of cases
under life insurance policies. Could any life insurance company
avoid its policy upon the evidence of this case? Most unquestionably not.
The evidence in this case does not establish a lucid interval at
the time of the making of the will. There was no manifest change
in his condition whatever at that time. What are known as "lucid
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intervals," arise in a wholly different class of cases : Gombault v.
Puli, Ad,m'r, 4 Brad. R. 226; White v. Wilson, 13 Vesey 87;
1 Redfield on Wills, sect. 14.
James 11VeCurley, Jr., and X. Il Pusey, for the appellee.
The essential requisites to constitute a valid testamentary act
(the formalities of the law with reference to the execution of the
.will having been complied with), are, that the testator, at the time
of the execution thereof, was capable of understanding the business
in which he was engaged, the property he desired to dispose of,
the object of his bounty named in the will, and that the same was
his free and voluntary act: Waters et al. v. W1aters, 35 Md. 536,
547; Biggins et al. v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 125, 144; Harrison
v. Iouan, 3 Wash. 0. C.-R. 586 ; Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371 ;
Potts et al. v. House, 6 Ga. 324; Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash.
C. C. R. 262 ; Kinne v. .Kinne, 9 Conn. 102.
The allegation in the caveat of undue influence, deceits, &c., has
not been sustained by the evidence; in fact there is no evidence
pointing in that direction. The law, in regard to the undue influence, which will invalidate a will, is well settled in this state:
T'son ct al. v. Tgson's .Ex'rs, 37 Md. 567, 582.
It isequally well settled, that in a caveat to a will, charging the
want of testamentary capacity on the part of the testator, the burden
of proof rests upon the caveators-the rule of law being that every
man is presumed to be sane until it is proved that he is otherwise:
Tyson et al. v. Tyson's Bx'rs, 37 Md. 582; Higgins v. Carlton,
28 Md. 141, 142.
The appellants do not claim that the testator was a maniac, that
he was habitually insane; the extent of their claim is that he was
partially insane-that lie was laboring under suicidalmania, and
their own witness, Dr. Morris, testifies that this is a special form
of insanity, and that it may exist among people whose intellectual
faculties are in other respects unimpaired.
In law, the absence or presence of delusion is the true and only
test or criterion of absent or present insanity; and in order to
invalidate the will of a person laboring under a delusion, it must
appear'thatthe will is the direct offspring of the delusion; that the
delusion infuenced the testator in the manner of the distribution
of his property; in other words, that the will, y reason of the
delusion, was different from that which it would have been, had
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the delusion not existed. Even admitting that the testator had
suicidal mania, it does not appear that that had any effect on his
mind in the disposition of his property: 1 Jarman on Wills 56,
note 7; Dew v. Clark, 3 Adams 79 ; Taylor's Mcd. Juris. 630,
655, 656 (5th Amer. edit.); Dunhlam's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192,
201, 202, 203; Duffield v. Morris, Ex'r, 2 Iarrington 375, 379,
380, 384 ; 1 Redfield on Wills 85.
It is not sufficient even to shift th~e burden of proof, much less to
establish the invalidity of this will, for the caveators to show that,
about a month prior to the execution of the will, the testator was in
such a state of delirium, produced by intoxication, as to incapacitate
him at that time from executing a will. ie had so far recovered
as that, on the 9th of March, his mind was clear, and the evidence
does not even show, that at any time fron the 1st of March, down
to the very instant of his death, the testator did not possess that
degree of testamentary capacity requisite to the making of a valid
will: 1 Redfield 91, 92, 93; Taylor's Mled. Juris. 632 (5th
Amer. edit.); Duffield v. M3orris's Ex'rs, 2 Harrington 384;
Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill 31.
It is not contended that a man is, under any circumstances,
justified in taking his own life, but that a person in the full enjoyment of his reason, may be so pressed upon by influences, from
within and from without, that he would, while a sane man, destroy
himself: Taylor's Med. Jurs. 677, 681 (5th Amer. edit.) ; Ray's
Med. Jurs., sects. 386, 397, 498, 399; Burrows v. Burrows, 1
Haggard 109; Duffield v. M'orris's Ex'rs, 2 Harrington 382,
383, 384; Terry v. Insurance Co., 1 Dillon 403; Nimick v.
Insurance Go., 10 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 101.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-The sole question in this appeal is whether the
testator was of "sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract," at the time of the execution of the
paper purporting to be his last will and testament.
This paper was executed in the forenoon of Saturday, April 3d,
and in the afternoon of the next day the testator died by his own
hands. Continuing insanity on the part of the testator is not
alleged, but it is insisted on the part of the appellants,. caveators
below, that at the time of the execution of the paper purporting
to be his will, the testator was laboring under what is termed sui-
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aidal mania; and that his mind was so disordered as to incapacitate
him for making a valid will.
With all the lights which the researches of modern inquiries
have elicited in regard to the condition of the mind, even in decided
cases of monomania or delusion, it is always a delicate and difficult
question to determine in such cases the precise condition of the
other mental faculties, or to ascertain with any degree of certainty
to what extent they may be implicated in the disorder.
By some writers, suicidal mania is regarded in all cases and
under all circumstances as a positive sign or symptom of insanity.
This view however is not sustained by the most eminent writers
on the subject, and certainly not by the weight ofjudicial authority.
Cases may and do often occur, in which this disorder so affects
the mental faculties as to make the party incompetent to execute
a will or valid contract; while on the other hand it is obvious that
it may exist, and persons may under its influence commit suicide
and yet possess their testamentary capacity unimpaired.
Where the act of self-destruction occurs immediately after the
execution of a will, it may justly be regarded as a fact tending to
establish a disordered condition of the mind, and the existence of
some morbid affection tending to the derangement of reason; and
a will executed under such circumstances should beget the greatest
watchfulness on the part of the court and the jury. But strange
and unaccountable as the phenomenon may appear to most persons,
the act of self-destruction cannot be judicially regarded as proof
per se of insanity. After all it is but a fact together with all other
facts in the case from which the court or jury are *todetermine the
testamentary capacity of the testator, not at the time of committing suicide, but at the time of the execution of the will in question.
In all cases it is true, the testator must be of sound and disposing mind, but the question of "sound" or "unsound mind"
must at last depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Where a testator freely understands the nature of the business
in which he is engaged, and has sufficient capacity to make a disposition of his estate with judgment and understanding in reference
to the amount and situation, and the relative claims of different
persons who are or who should be the objects of his bounty, this
court has repeatedly held that in such cases the testatoris to be
considered of sound and disposing mind within the meaning of the
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statute: Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. .302; Colhci v. Thuf0rd et
al., 20 Md. 355; Higgins et al. v. Coulton, 28 Ald. 115.
With these well-established principles to guide us, we now come
to the facts in the record before us, upon which the testamentary
capacity of the testator is sought to be impeached.
The testator was a police officer in the city of Baltimore, and
addicted to the habit of indulging occasionally to excess in the use
of intoxicating drinks. To Mrs. Habbersett, with whom lie boarded,
he admitted this propensity to be so strong as to amount to a disease, against which he was continually struggling, and which at
times he was unable to resist. So early as the middle of February,
six weeks at least prior to the execution of the will in question, he
began to drink, and continued to drink to excess until the 7th of
March, at which time with all the approaching symptom of mania
a potu, he was taken to the Mount Hope Hospital. He was laboring
at that time, says Dr. Stokes, the physician to the hospital, under
the usual physical effects of hard drinking, vomiting, and very
nervous, but that his mind was clear. Here he remained until
March 13th, just one week, and although much better, he was still
suffering from nervous prostration.
On the 20th of the same month he resumed his duties as police
officer, but in a few days was obliged to report himself unfit for
duty. He was still weak and nervous, and seemed to feel keenly
his situation; said the merchants on his beat would shake hands
with him, and tell him not to drink any more, and that even the
negroes wanted to know where he had been. In the meantime, he
was summoned before the police board to answer charges preferred
against him for drunkenness, and although not dismissed he was
publicly reprimanded before his squad.
These circumstances
tended still more to depress him-he complained of being unwellremained in his room-seemed to be very nervous-said he didn't
care to remain in the police force, but could not bear the idea of
being discharged for drunkenness-in fact his condition and conduct were such as to excite the apprehensions of Mrs. llabbersett,
with whom he boarded, and also officer Riley, that he intended to
commit suicide.
On Wednesday, the 21st of March, he sent for Doctor Allan
Smith, who came the next day, and prescribed a solution of bromide
of potassium, a medicine administered to soothe the nervous system.
On Friday morning, April 2d, witness Veasel, a member of the
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relief committee of the George Washington Lodge, No. 18, Knights
of Pythias, called to see the testator for the purpose of paying him
certain benefits, to which as a sick member of the lodge he was
entitled. These benefits the testator refused to take, and requested
they should be donated to the lodge, for the benefit of the widow
and orphans' fund. As witness was about to leave the room, the
testator told him he wanted to see some members of the lodge, and
after some further conversation, said, " I have a little money in the
Savings Bank, and I want to give it to the lodge ;" witness then
asked if there was no one besides the lodge to whom he desired to
leave the money, he said "No ;" and in answer to the further
question, "whether some one else would not fall heir to it, if the
money was not left to the lodge," he replied, "Yes, but I want to
fix it so that the lodge can get it if anything should happen to me."
It thus appears, the first suggestion in regard to a will came
from the testator, and when the witness intimated the propriety
of leaving the property to others, the answer of the testator shows
that lie had fully made up his mind at that time to give it to the
lodge. This purpose was expressed in the most decided manner,
and so far as this interview is concerned, there is nothing certainly
from which the conclusion of testamentary incapacity can be drawn.
In consequence of the request thus made of the witness, Messrs.
Lewis, Wells, and Freish, members of the Lodge, called to see him
on the evening-of the same day, April 2d. After some general conversation about the weather, Lewis asked him what he wanted with
them; to which he replied, "I have a little money in the Savings
Bank, and I want to leave it to George Washington Lodge." He
then requested Lewis to go for a magistrate, suggesting Mr. Hayes,
who lived in the neighborhood; not being able to find the magistrate, Lewis returned, and asked the testator if the next day would
not do, to which he replied, " I suppose so." After some general
conversation on the topics of the day, in which the testator participated, the parties left with the understanding they were to returif
the next morning.
The testimony of Wells relative to this interview is substantially
the same as that of Lewis, with the addition of some conversation
which took place during Lewis's absence, about the success of the
lodge.
Freisb, the other witness who was present at this interview of
April 2d, says the question was asked, whether he had any rela-
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tives, to which the testator replied, that he had buried his father
and mother in 1858, that he had brothers and sisters, but he did
not care about leaving them anything, and that he had made up
his mind three years ago to leave what he had to the lodge. The
witnesses Wells and Lewis had known the testator intimately for
three or four years, and they both testify they saw nothing peculiar in his conduct, nor did they notice anything about the expression of his eyes or countenance, different from what they had been
accustomed to see in him.
The next interview with the testator took place according to
appointment on Saturday morning, April 3d, and lasted from 9
until 12 o'clock. Lewis testifies that after some conversation, Mr.
Wells, at the testator's request, went for the magistrate, and during
his absence, witness again asked the testator if he had not some
one else to leave his money to besides the lodge; if he had not a
father or mother alive; testator replied "No, I huried then in
1858." Witness then said, "Have you no brother or sister ?" Ile
replied "Yes, but I don't want to leave it to them; I am not on good
terms with them-if I leave it to George Washington Lodge, it
will be taken good care of."
Wells returned, and said the magistrate would be there in a few
minutes. In the meantime a general conversation took place;
topics of the day discussed; allusion was made to a wagon belonging to witness Wells, and which was run over by the cars some time
before in Pratt street; the testator saw the accident, and described
how in such cases the fault was generally with the driver of the
wagon. In the midst of the conversation, testator saw the magis
trate on the opposite side of the street, and said, " There is Bob
now, go down and let him in." The magistrate came up stairs
and after the usual salutations, asked the testator what he wanted
with him, to which he replied,. "1 want you to write my will," and
said he had some money in the Baltimore Savings Institution,
which he desired to leave to George Washington Lodge, No. 18,
Knights of Pythias. The magistrate then asked him how much
he had; he said "I don't know exactly, I will get my bank-book ;"
he sat down, added up his bank book and said, "I have $3560."
The will was then drawn by the magistrate, and read by him to
the testator, and then read by the testator himself. The initial
letter " B" of the testator's middle name was left out, and this
the testator noticed and directed it to be inserted in its proper
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place. After its execution, the will was folded and endorsed by
the magistrate, and then handed by him to the testator, who again
observed that the letter R was left out in the endorsement, and
it was again inserted at his request. The testator then asked the
magistrate how much he charged for his services, and directed
Mrs. Habbersett to pay the same. He then delivered the will to
Lewis, .nd directed him to have it recorded.
During the whole of this interview, lasting more than three
hours, the parties present saw nothing either in the manner or conduct of the testator to excite the slightest suspicion in regard to
his sanity; on the contrary, they all say, that in their opinion, he
was of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid
deed or contract. In addition to this, Mrs. Habbersett, who had
watched over him during his sickness, and Doctor Theobald, who
called to see him professionally on the day the will was executed,
both testify that he was fully competent to make a will.
If the case rested here, and the burden of proof was upon the
caveatees, and not where the law places it, upon the caveators, no
doubt we think could be entertained in regard to the testamentary
capacity of the testator. The proof shows, that the will was his
free and voluntary act, that he fully understoodthe nature of the
business in which he was engaged-that he had suff ient capacity
to make a disposition of his property with judgment and understanding, both in reference to the amount involved, and the relative claims of different persons, who were or should have been the
objects of his bounty.
Against testimony so strong and conclusive, we have the fact,
that for some time before the execution of the will the testator had
been drinking to excess-that after his return from Mount Hope
Asylum, he was still weak and nervous, and out of health-that
he was depressed in spirits, and disposed to take a gloomy'view of
affairs-that the day preceding the execution of the will, he was
at times flighty, which he attributed to the medicine prescribed by
Doctor Smith; that his conduct and manner were such as to excite
the suspicion of both Mrs. Habbersett and officer Riley of an
intention to commit suicide.
In addition to this, we have the intelligent testimony of Doctor
Morris, who was called to see him on Sunday, the day after the
execution of the will, and the day on which the suicide was committed, and who, after a careful examination of his symptoms and
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observation of his conduct, came to the conclusion he was laboring
under "suicidal inznia." The doctor however says, he seemed
rational, and that this form of mania may exist without impairing
the other mental faculties. Be that as it may, whatever doubt the
testimony thus offered on the part of the caveators might excite if
considered alone, yet when weighed with the proof on the part of
the caveatees, we feel obliged to say, that it fails to establish such
a want of testamentary capacity as would justify us in pronouncing against this will.
Decree affirmed.
Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.
LEWIS HAYNER v. TRUMAN S. COWDEN.
Words charging a clergyman with drunkenness, when spoken of and concerning him in his office or calling, are actionable per se.
In an action where punitive damages may be allowed, evidence of the defendant's pecuniary ability is admissible.
It is not error to refuse to charge the jury, that if the defendant believed the
charge to be true, though he had not reasonable cause for such belief, they could
not award exemplary damages, where there is evidence tending to show that he
uttered the words in a wanton and reckless manner.
ERROR to the District Court of Miami county.
pear in the opinion of the court.

The facts ap-

James Murray,with whom were . T. Janvier and ff. G. Sellers,
for plaintiff in error:1. A charge of drunkenness is notper se actionable.: Hfollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 433; Alfele v. Wriglt, 17 Id. 239.;
Dialv. Holter, 6 Id. 235; Buck v. Hersey, 31 Maine 558; O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. Law; Addison on Torts 4.
2. That the defendant is a minister of the gospel, does not
change the rule. Ministers ought not to be regarded in the eye of
the law.as purer or holier than any other men, nor entitled to protection in any greater degree. The law is no longer a respecter
of persons; it no longer makes any distinction between classes or
conditions of men; its guiding star now is "equality before the
law for all."
3. If the words spoken are actionable per se, it can only be in
a case where they are spoken in reference to the performance of
his ministerial duties: Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 801 ; 1 Tyrw.
217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249; Ayre v. Craven, 2
Adol. & El. 2.
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In this case the word "preacher" was evidently used for the
sole purpose of identifying the person to whom reference was
made.
4. It must be averred that at the time the words were spoken
plaintiff was a paid preacher, or in the receipt of temporal emoluments derived therefrom: Gallwey v. -4larshall,9 Exeh. 295;
Starr v. Gardnrr,.6 Upper Canada Q. B. 0. S. 512; Hartley
v. Herring, 8 Term 130.
5. The court erred in refusing to charge that if defendant had
no reasonable cause to believe the words to be true when he uttered
them, yet if the jury found that he did in fact believe then to be
true, then the case was not one for exemplary, but for compensatory
damages merely.
The distinction between malice in law and malice in fact is well
settled. Malice in law is that malice which the law presumes to
exist from the mere doing of an unlawful act; while malice in fact
is that which exists when there is superadded to the other an evil
intention in the party doing the act.
The only cases in which exemplary or punitive damages may be
given are those in which actual or express malice is shown: Roberts
v. i1iason, 10 Ohio St. 283; Pitt v. .Donovan, 1 I. & Sel. 639;
Armstrong v. Pierson, 8 Clarke 29.
6. The court erred in admitting evidence as to the defendant's
wealth, for the purpose of aggravating damages.
This whole theory of taking money from one man and giving
it to another, under the plea that it is for purposes of punishment,
however plausible it may appear at first blush, is wholly untenable
in practice. It will not be claimed that a jury can or ought to go
into an investigation as to all these extraneous matters; and yet,
unless they do so, how are they -to arrive at any proper measure
of punishment? Money may be the god of this world, but it is
iuost evidently very much more the god of one man than it is of
another. The loss of it hurts one man vastly more than it does
another. We say, then, that the mere taking from a defendant
of a certain amount of money in proportion to his wealth can never
be considered as a true rule or basis fdr the purposes of punishment,
and that it is at variance with all settled princi'ples of the
law: 11rare v. Cartledge, 24 Ala. 622; Palmer v. iHosicins, 28
Barb. 90; Townshend on Slander, sect. 391; 2 Greenl. Ev., sect.
249.
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Conover & Craighead, with Morris J- Son, for defendant in
error:1. Words which would not otherwise be actionable per so
may be so when spoken of a party in his profession or calling:
Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531; Wilson v. Runyion, Wright
651; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 102; M1alone v. Stewart and Wife, 15
Ohio 319; 6 Ohio St. 228; 17 Id. 238; Buck v. Hcrsey, 31
Maine 558.
That charges, such as are here alleged, made against a minister
of the gospel falsely, are thus actionable, was long since determined
by three courts of highest character, whose decisions have not, so
far as we know, been overruled or questioned: Ohaddock v. Briggs,
13 Mass. 251 ; MeMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney 178; Demarest v.
Haring, 6 Cowen 76; 1 Am. Lead. Cas., cited supra.
If the words spoken of the plaintiff below were true, their natural
and obvious tendency was to unfit him for, disgrace him in, and
deprive him of said ministerial office and the emoluments thereof.
Words spoken falsely of any tradesman, officer, or professional
man, which, if true, thus prejudice or injure him in reference to
the pursuit in which he is engaged, are actionable without special
injury being alleged.
2. Evidence as to the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant
was properly admitted: Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277;
White v. Thomas, 12 Id. 319; McBride v. McLaughlin, 5
Watts 075; Waggoner v. Richmond, Wright 173; Sexton v. Todd,
Id. 320.
3. The court did not err in the charge given to the jury : Runt
v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Fowler v. Bowen, 30 Id. 20; '3 G. &
W. on New Trials 726, 817; Darby v. Ouseley, 1 Hurl. & Nor. 1;
Nichols v. Packard,16 Verm. -83. Or in refusing to give the
charge requested: 1 Townshend on Slander, sect. 361; Thomas
v. White, 12 Ohio St. 316; Ash v. M1arlow, 20 Ohio 119.
The jury is the tribunal to determine as to malice: White v.
Nichols, 3 How. 266; Nichols v. Packard,16 Vt. 83; Adcockv.
1arsh, 8 Ired. 360 ; Abram8 v. Smith, 3 Blackford 95.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WRIGHT, J.-The slander alleged in the petition consists in
falsely charging plaintiff, a minister of the gospel, with drunkeinness. It is also averred that the words were spoken of and con-
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cerning him in his ministerial profession and pastoral office. The
denurrer admits all that is averred, and thus this question is
raised: Are words which charge a minister of the gospel with
drunkenness, when spoken of him in his profession or calling,
actionableper se? We answer that they are. We understand
the rule to be, that words spoken of a person, tending to injure
him in his office, profession, or trade, are thus actionable: 1
Starkie on Slander 9; Townshend on Libel and Slander, sec. 182;
2 Addison on Torts 957 (see. 2, chap. 17; ed. of 1876, of this
book, has a large collection of authorities on the subject) ; 1 Am.
Lead. Cas. 102; Poulger v. Newcomb, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 827;
Demarest v. Haring, 6 Cow. 76.
Calling a clergyman a drunkard was held actionable in lfel'lIan v. Birh, 1 Binney 176; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 251.
Such words are actionable because they tend to deprive him of
the emoluments which pertain to his profession, and may prevent
his obtaining employment. It is not, as counsel seem to suppose,
that giving a clergyman this right of action is because his office is
higher than that of his fellow men. It is a right which belongs to
all who have professions or callings, and in this clergymen are
not different from otfiers.
This principle is entirely different from that upon which proceeded the cases of Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial
v. H lter, 6 Id. 228; Alfele v. Wright, 17 Id. 238. In all these,
the words imputed a criminal offence, and did not relate to profession or calling.
Upon the trial of the case, it was insisted by defendant that the
words were not spoken of the plaintiff in his character as a minister.
The court fairly left this to the jury, and said if they were not so
spoken, they should find for defendant. The jury find this issue
for the plaintiff, and in the face of that finding it is impossible for
us, sitting as a court of error, to say that they were not spoken of
the plaintiff in his character or capacity as a clergyman. If they
were, as we have seen, they are actionable.
In the cases cited by defendant, Lumby v. Allday, 1 Tyrw. 217 ;
Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & IV. 249 ; Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. 2 ;
Buck v. Rersey, 31 Me. 558 ; Redway v. Gray, 81 Vt. 292 ; Van
Tapel v. Capron, 1 Denio 250; it was held that the words spoken
did not touch the plaintiffs in their various trades or employments.
But to charge a minister with drunkenness does have such an effect.
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Congregations would not employ clergymen with intemperate
habits, and the development of such a vice would be cause for
speedy removal from office. When the question is reduced to a
mere matter of dollars and cents, the purity, the integrity, the
uprightness of a minister's life is his capital in this world's business.
Against the objection made, plaintiff offered evidence of the
wealth of the defendant, and in the charge the court said this
evidence might be considered in connection with the question of
exemplary damages. We see no error in the admission of the
evidence, or the charge of the court upon the subject. That punitive or exemplary damages in a proper case may be given, is not
an open question in Ohio. In Roberts v. MZlason, 10 Ohio St. 277 ;
Smith v. P., Ft. IT. & . Railroad, 23 Id. 10, the court allowed
the jury to consider the wealth of defendant in connection with the
question of punitive damages. If, then, punishment be an object
of a verdict, a small sum would not be felt by a defendant of large
wealth. The vengeance of the law would scarcely be appreciated,
and he could afford to pay and slander still. There are cases
which put the admission of the evidence upon this ground. A 1hi
v. Morten, 21 Ohio St. 536, intimates that the reason is to enable
the jury to determine how much plaintiff has -been injured. This
case collects the authorities on both sides of the question, to which
might be added McBride v. MoLaugidin, 5 Watts 375 ; Waggoner
v. Richmond, Wright 173; Sexton v. Todd, Id. 320; 2 Greenl.
Ev. 249; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 199, note 6; .lorsley v. Brooks, 20
Ia. 115; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 153. We see no error in
the admission of the evidence, or the charge of the court on the
subject.
There are some other questions raised by counsel, to which we
briefly allude:The defendant asked the court to charge the jury: "If they
find that the words spoken by the defendants of and concerning
the plaintiff were untrue, and that the defendant has not reasonable
cause to believe them to be true; yet, if they are satisfied from the
evidence that the defendant did believe them to be true, such state
of facts would not warrant a verdict for punitive or exemplary
damages, but for compensatory damages only." With which request the court refused to comply, but, on the contrary, charged
the jury that such was not the law, to which the defendant then
and there excepted.
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We do not understand tile law of slander to be, that it is a
defecee that the slanderer believed his words to be true, when he
had no grounds for so believing. Belief must have a foundation
in something. Take away foundation, and what can be left?
The charge asked seems to us a solecism.* Belief can only- be
claimed as a defence, or in mitigation, where it is based upon such
facts or reasons as would incline a reasonable person so to believe.
Inasmuch as this charge was asked in reference to exemplary damages, and there was evidence tending to show that the words had
been spoken under circumstances indicating wantonness and recklessness, the charge was properly refused.
It appears to be seriously argued that, in a minister of the gospel, a single act of intoxication is not a fault, and therefore a
charge of that kind cannot be injurious. We can hardly assent
to this proposition. In a religious teacher, one offence of the kind
must be considered a grave departure from propriety and duty;
and to say that the act has been committed is calculated to impair
usefulness.
As to the question of excessive damages, the verdict was large;
still we do not think defendant can complain, in view of all the
Judgment affirmed.
circumstances of the case.
DAY, J., dissented as to the admissibility of evidence of defendant's pecuniary ability.

Supreme Court of illinois.
WILLIAM ROTH v. MARY EPPY.
Under the statute of Illinois giving a right of action against a person selling
liquor to a habitual drunkard it is sufficient to aver and prove that habitual
intoxication was caused in part by such sale. It is a tort and plaintiff may recover
as in other torts if there is enough evidence to support any part of his charge.
In an action by a wife for selling liquor to her husband, evidence that his
intoxication led to loss of his situation and inability to get other employment is
admissible.
Exemplary damages can only be recovered where there is damage in fact. Exemplary and punitive damages are synonymous terms.
The right of action is given by th6 statute to the person injured without reference to the defendant's knowledge of the consequences of his act.

THis was an action on the case, brought by Mary Eppy, under
the Liquor Act, against William Rotb, to recover for injury in her
means of support, in consequence of the habitual intoxication of
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her husband, George Eppy, from intoxicating liquors sold and
given to him by Roth. The plaintiff in the case below recovered
a verdict and judgment for $1200, and the defendant appealed.
Appellee's husband had for years been drinking to excess at
appellant's drinking saloon and continued to drink there up to the
time he became insane, June 21st 1874. lie was sent to the Insane Asylum at Elgin in July 1874, and remained there under
treatment until some time in April 1875, when he was released and
returned home.
Puterbaugh,Lee & Quinn and Charles -einse, for defendant.
L. Rarmon, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-There are various reasons urged for the reversal
of the judgment.
The averment in the declaration is, that the defendant sold and
gave to Eppy intoxicating liquors "and thereby caused him, the
said George Eppy, to become and he was during that time before
named habitually intoxicated." It is claimed this is an averment
that the intoxication was caused in whole by the defendant and
that such must be the proof; that it is not sufficient that the intoxication was caused in part by defendant; and that the most which
the proof shows is that defendant caused the intoxication in.
part.
The statute gives the right of action, where the defendant shall
have caused the intoxication in whole or in part. Contracts are
entire and must be proved substantially as alleged, but torts are
divisible, and in them the plaintiff may prove a part of his charge
and recover if there be enough proved to support the tort : fillv.
Blanford, 45 Ill. 8. This objection we regard as without force.
The point is made that the statute upon which appellee relied
for a recovery was repealed before the suit was instituted.
The suit was brought under the provisions of an act entitled
"An act to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of
intoxicating liquors in the state of Illinois," approved January
13th 1872. It is said this act was, fully revised by statutes of
1874 in an act entitled "An act to provide for the licensing of
and against the evils arising from the sale of intoxicating liquors,"
approved March 30th 1874, and in force July 1st 1874; that
the statute of 1874 was a revision of the whole subject and was
intended as a substitute for the Act of 1872, and therefore the Act
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of 1872 was repealed, and ceased to be in force July 1st 1874,
which was before the commencement of this suit. A complete
answer is found to this position on page 1012 Rev. Stat. 1874,
under sections 2 and 4, where it is provided that no new law shall
be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is
expressly rpealed or not, as to any offence comnlitted against the
former law, or as to any act done, or any right accrued or claim
:arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any
such offence or act so committed or done, or any right accrued or,
claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the
proceedings thereafter shall conform so far as practicable to the
laws in force at the time of such proceeding.
It is insisted that the evidence fails to show any habitual intoxication on the part of George Eppy.
It is conceded by appellant's counsel that the insanity of Eppy
was caused by long-continued, excessive use of alcoholic liquors;
that lie had been in the habit of using intoxicating liquors to excess
for many years, but it is denied that it was to the extent of being
habitually intoxicated. Very many witnesses on both sides were
examined upon this point. Facts were detailed and the opinions
of witnesses given. There was a conflict of testimony as to opinions
of witnesses, whether, at the various times testified to, the condition
of Eppy from the liquor he drank was one of intoxication or not.
The testimony of some of the witnesses was that they frequently
saw Eppy at defendant's place intoxicated. Other witnesses stated'
his condition as verging on but not amounting to actual intoxication.
The question was one of fact for the determination of the jury.
upon the whole evidence in the light of their own observation.
We think the decision of the question should rest with the finding
of the jury, no sufficient reason appearing for disturbing it.
It is insisted that the court below admitted improper and rejected
proper evidence. Eppy having recovered he returned home from
the insane asylum in April 1875, and inquiries were made of
witnesses as to his efforts to get employment, to obtain his former
situation as locomotive engineer on the railroad, and his inability
to do so. Exception was taken to such inquiries, which were
permitted.
As bearing upon the question of damages, it Yas proper to show
any want of and inability to obtain employment in consequence
of Eppy's previous habits of intoxication. The inquiry as to his
VOL. XXV.-15
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desire for intoxicating liquors should have been excluded, but the
refusal to exclude the inquiry was not of sufficient importance to
amount to a fatal error.
Some evidence as to Eppy and his wife drinking together was
excluded, which might properly have been received on the question
of exemplary damages; but there was much other evidence of the
same character, which was received, which was abundantly sufficient for all purpose of advantage to the defendant on that head.
There was no error in not admitting proof of a license.
Objection is taken to the giving, modifying and refusing of
instructions. Several of the questions raised under the instructions
were met and disposed of adversely to the views of appellant's
counsel, in the case of Rackett v. Smelsdey, decided at the January
Term 1875, and we need not further allude thereto. Other questions are sufficiently disposed of by what has already been said.
The third instruction for the plaintiff was that under its hypothesis the jury had a right, if they thought proper, to allow the plaintiff such punitive damages as they thought the evidence warranted.
It is erroneously supposed that this militates against the dcecision
in Preese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496. All that was there decided in
regard to exemplary damages, was that to support a finding of
exemplary damages, there must be a finding of actual damages,
and that Without this, exemplary damages cannot be awarded.
But the present instruction was on the hypothesis among others
that actual damage had been sustained. The employment in the
instruction of the words "punitive damages" instead of "exemplary damages" was not material. They are synonymous terms:
HRackett v. Snzelsley, supra.
Some of the instructions for plaintiff may be faulty in being argumentative, but there is not sufficient in this respect to make them
fatally erroneous.
We perceive no error in any modification which was made of
defendant's instructions.
The fifteenth instruction asked by the defendant, which the court
refused to give, was one that assumed to define the words "habitual
intoxication." These are terms in common use, generally understood in their application, more or less familiar to the observation
of all unlearned persons, of no peculiar legal signification, calling
for judicial exposition. The definition which was here asked to
be given, was not especially instructive to a jury. We do not
consider that for the want of this instruction, there was a loss to

